Pakistan's democratic institutions would prevent the Taliban and al-Qaeda from receiving the support that empowered them to challenge the U.S. in Afghanistan. 4 These demands however led to tensions and culminated in a major fissure between the two countries in 2011 that included a major controversy over a CIA contractor (Raymond Davis), 5 a strongly worded critique of the U.S. drone campaign by the then Army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani; 6 and, finger pointing and waving by both sides. 7 By 2012 one could discern a reversal of policy, with Washington realizing that it cannot turn Pakistan into a strong, neoliberal, democratic state, leading to less public, open statements by U.S. senior policymakers on Pakistan and affairs. 8 Nevertheless, the U.S. remains unable to engage with Pakistan on its own, consistently seeing its relations with the South Asia country through U.S. concerns with Afghanistan.
The central thesis promoted in this paper is that U.S. relations with Pakistan when constructed through a pragmatic engagement lens as opposed to some ideologically-inspired, neoliberal agenda understood as democracy promotion 9 do not lead to disappointments, disapprobation and reproaches. Interspersed within this observation is the argument that U.S. relations with Pakistan are determined by U.S. security concerns vis-à-vis Afghanistan. The paper aims to show that in the post-9/11 period, U.S. decision-making vis-à-vis Pakistan instead of being centered on Pakistan per se, are structured on along two lines: how to ensure stability in 4 See, for example, Barack Obama, 'The way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan', Eisenhower Hall Theatre, United States Military Academy at West Point, West Point, New York, Dec. 1 2009. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan; Seth G. Pakistani counterpart and are more interested in defeating al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In advocating for a pragmatic engagement, the aim is to highlight the value of pragmatism to foreign policy analysis, especially as pragmatism has rich philosophical tradition, 13 albeit not so much in the field of international relations. 14 Thus, in the context of this research, pragmatic engagement amounts to an anti-doctrinal approach to international relations that focuses on 'what works.' 15 Notably, methodologically pragmatism provides ways to appraise and judge progress through experience, as opposed to Kantian reasoning which is often devoid of empirical content 16 . Thus, in attempting to shed light on U.S. relations with Pakistan and its future, the paper underlines some of the historical objectives of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis Pakistan, before shifting attention to 9/11, when a commitment was made to defeat Islamic terrorists, particularly those that had sanctuary in Afghanistan. 17 However, whereas under President Bush the interaction was pragmatic, under President Obama, the U.S. attempted to pursue a more active, liberal policy aimed at democracy promotion in respect to 10 11 On October 14, 2014, Dan Fedlman, the special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan in a remarks before the Atlantic Council acknowledged this, though he seems to suggest that this had advantages and disadvantages for Pakistan -it received political attention and access to resources, but it also experienced more terrorist activities that resulted in the deaths of over 50,000 Pakistanis. Science, Vol. 51, No. 1 (2007), pp. 151-165; Gunther Hellmann, 'Pragmatism and International Relations', International Studies Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2009), pp. 638-662; Steve Wood, 'Pragmatic power EUrope?', Cooperation & Conflict, Vol. 46, No. 2 (2011) 15 Pragmatic engagement is different from realism in that first it does not seek to build a research program nor engage in paradigmatic battles, but to focus on language and methods and in doing so recognize focus on the present. Helena Rytövuori-Apunen, 'Abstractive Observation as the Key to the 'Primacy of Practice '', International Studies Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2009), pp. 641-645;  16 John Kaag recognizes that centrality of experience in classical pragmatic thought, leading him to state "Pragmatism is difficult to define because it is not one thing. It bespeaks ways, directions, and pathmarks that guide us in traversing the rough terrain of the experimental landscape." John Jacob Kaag, 'Pragmatism and the Lessons of Experience ', Daedalus, Vol. 138, No. 2 (2009), p. 71. 17 'President Bush Addresses the Nation ', Washington Post, Sept. 20, 2001 . http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html. Draft, Please Do Not Copy without Explicit Permission from Author Pakistan. 18 The policy led to increased tensions between the two countries, causing a major rift that eventually 
Between Ungoverned Territories and Social Identity Groups
Two key factors are obstacles to Pakistan's stability and ability to conduct foreign relations, specifically with the United States. The first obstacle is the presence of three social identity groups that dominate the political system -the army, the landed gentry, which includes the elite industrialists, and the religious polity -and control the state and its resources. There are a number of ways to examine the development of social groups, although it ultimately the process begins with identity and the individual. Drawing on the work of Max Weber, who identified groups as a product of the belief system of their members, which means that individuals focus on their role within society, Asef Bayat emphasizes fluidity and fragmentation within social movement. Under this interpretation, the development of a group rests with a person's identity, seen as a "social category": Pakistani woman, Muslim employee and so on. Social groups emerge when individuals recognize or develop certain social characteristics leading them to identify themselves or be identified by the larger community as a group. The process entails social comparison whereby those that for the group do so because they claim to have norms, values, expectations that allow them to isolate or distinguish themselves from others and in doing reinforce their own in-groupness. In Pakistan, the main social groups are the army, which is largely homogenous in that 18 The democracy promotion agenda is not a new concept, as there is a tendency in U. 19 This may explain why the Obama administration has not only been surprisingly quiet on the Nawaz Sharif government's decision to seek peace talks with the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) but has curtailed much of the drone program, focusing only on al-Qaeda and less on the TPP. Karen DeYoung and Greg Miller, 'U.S. said to curtail drone strikes in Pakistan as officials there seek peace talks with Taliban', Washington Post, Feb. 4, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-curtails-drone-strikes-in-pakistan-as-officials-there-seekpeace-talks-with-taliban/2014/02/04/1d63f52a-8dd8-11e3-833c-33098f9e5267_story.html. 20 John Kaag and Sarah Kreps, 'Pragmatism's Contributions to International Relations', Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2012) , p. 192. Draft, Please Do Not Copy without Explicit Permission from Author by joining the military one accepts certain standards and norms, as well as services designed to illicit homogeneity, which is why historically the army has always claimed that it is the only institution that is truly Pakistani. The two other groups -the religious (Sunni) polity and the feudal, landowning, industrial class -are more heterogeneous in nature, making the process of social identity far more difficult turbulent as they are prone to in-group infighting and necessitating a more stringent process of self-identification. Nonetheless, the key emphasis is on the social aspect that brings individuals to support these groups. In contemporary Pakistan, each group has a substantial following, which mean that their importance to the Pakistani political system is that, that only when they form of an understanding over sharing governance is the political system stable. That is, the groups embrace a pragmatic assessment that boils down to what service and interest the group receives from being supportive of the government. Afghanistan has come to play a crucial role in each of the aforementioned groups. For the Army, Afghanistan provides both security and insecurity. On the security aspect, the Pakistani Army sees Afghanistan as providing it with strategic depth should India attack Pakistan.
Simply put, the assumption being that the Pakistani army could retreat into Afghanistan from which it would continue to fight the Indians. 21 Conversely, Afghanistan also poses a security threat to Pakistan because of the Durand Line, which separates the Pashtun population, some of whom live in Pakistan and some in Afghanistan ensuring constant friction between the two countries for decades, as Pakistan fears Pashtun irredentism. 22 It is arguably this fear that encourage Pakistan to support the Taliban, with the hope that a religious, Pashtun-based regime in Kabul would control those calling and demanding for the Pashtunistan. 23 The importance of Afghanistan varies, though for the more conservative Pakistani religious groups, as groups such as Jamaat-iIslami entered the Afghan refugee camps with the purpose of instilling a militant interpretation of Islam to encourage Afghans to partake in a holy war (jihad) against the Soviets, 24 whereas a group such as Lashkar-e- 21 The premise is based on the way the Russian Armies kept retreating as Napoleon's Grande Armée kept advancing until winter set, which is when the French began retreating, allowing the Russians to harass and weaken the French until it was destroyed. , 1947 -1952 ', The Middle East Journal, Vol. 68, No. 2 (2014 Ganguly and Howenstein write "The Taliban victory finally gave Pakistan's politico-military establishment a longsought goal: namely, what they believed to be a pliant regime in Afghanistan, one that would grant it strategic depth against India. The second barrier is the presence of ungoverned territories -areas over which the central government has little to no real control, many of which are located along the border with Afghanistan, such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. These territories have become havens for actors engaging in national, regional, and international acts of violence that threaten peace and security. 26 Their significance to U.S. relations with Pakistan is the fact that contemporary American counterinsurgency doctrine underlines the need to challenge terrorist safe-havens, which often emerge in ungoverned territories or in failed/weak state through infrastructure building and military activity. 27 The issue however as noted correctly by one commentator is that the Pakistani State is not only "hampered by its physical lack of presence in the FATA, but longstanding tribal codes known collectively as Pashtunwali, which among other things demand the provision of hospitality to strangers, create social safe havens for criminal elements and anti-state insurgents." 28 Simply, there is a sense, often found in the United States, that the Pakistani political establishment accepts the existence of these territories and the groups that dominate them, as long as those that live in those areas do not threaten the center or the establishment, which often explains the willingness to sign ceasefire agreements with the non-state actors -local Taliban groups and/or tribal militias -that control the areas in return for these actors confining their activities to the territories. Nevertheless, over the last few years, the inability to impose the government's remit on the large swath of territory, coupled with the increase in domestic terrorism, has been identified as a major problem, which explains why successive governments have sought to meet some local demands in terms of governance and investment as well as greater attempts to assimilate people from those locales into mainstream political institutions, particularly the army. 29 The issue however is that the measures are actually not designed to address the reasons as to why the local community tends to support non- These two obstacles are intimately linked as by controlling territory, the social groups have a basis to persuade, cajole, or compel the established actors to cede some power and resources of the state to them, as they are able to employ violence, which ultimately threatens the state and the power of the established actors.
U.S.-Pakistan Relations & Afghanistan
Relations between Pakistan and the United States have been fraught with difficulties, misunderstandings, and anger. Historically, U.S. interests in Pakistan were strategic, aimed at preventing Soviet encroachment into South Asia and the outbreak of an Indo-Pakistani war, especially a nuclear one, coupled with a commitment to avoid any military entanglements in South Asia. 31 International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1995) , pp. 79-114; William Walker, 'International Nuclear Relations after the Indian and Pakistani test Explosions', International Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3 (1998), pp. 505-528. 32 Simply, Washington became involved in the conflict in Afghanistan because of Cold War political consideration, aimed at protecting and promoting U.S. national interests. Thomas P. Thornton, 'The New Phase in U.S.-Pakistani Relations ', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 3 (1989) , pp. 142-159; Iftikhar H. Malik, 'The Pakistan-US Security Relationship: Testing Bilateralism', Asian Survey, Vol. 30, No 3 (1990) , pp. 284-299; Hamza Alavi, 'Pakistan-US Military Alliance ', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 33, No. 25 (Jun. 20-26, 1998) 35 In return, Washington made three commitments to Islamabad. First, ensuring that the Northern Alliance, whom many in Pakistan saw as an Indian proxy, would not form a government in Kabul. Second, Washington would take a more proactive stance in resolving the dispute over Kashmir, especially as Pakistanis feel that India is obstructing any meaningful progress over Kashmir. 36 Third, Pakistan's nuclear weapons and delivery systems would remain intact. 37 Clearly both sides did not nor could not fulfill each other's demands, mainly because there were far too ambitious. However, relations between the two would probably have remained stable, by which the U.S. would make no meaningful demands on Pakistan, accepting Pervez Musharraf's questionable policies which were delaying the return for civilian government to Pakistan, had the Afghanistan situation not deteriorated (increased Taliban activity), which U.S. policymakers came to believe was linked to the political situation in Pakistan. 38 Simply, over the last decade or so, U.S. relations with Pakistan have not been structured strategically but rather by events and conditions in Afghanistan, which essentially mean that Pakistan is often an after-thought in U.S. foreign policy consideration.
The Obama administration, frustrated with the Taliban blocking progress in Afghanistan, and to justify the demand for a larger commitment to Afghanistan particularly in terms of troop contribution, emphasized Pakistan's democratic shortcomings. Simply, the Obama administration's position appeared to be that the reason why the international and U.S. led efforts in Afghanistan were not bearing fruits was because spoilers in Pakistan were enabling the Afghan Taliban, 39 and not the way reconstruction was structured and developed by the key stakeholders in 2001. 40 This stance was discernable when Barack Obama was campaign for the Richard Holbrook, the U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan credited with coining the term, maintained that AfPak neologism expressed the new U.S. approach to the conflict in Afghanistan 43 that identified Pakistan and Afghanistan as a single theater of operations that required better management of resources but also a regional solution that includes India. 44 AfPak made two key assumptions. First, the root cause of the U.S. and the international community's failure to defeat the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda while rebuilding the country lay with Pakistan's willingness to provide sanctuaries in its territory for Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda forces to conduct operations against allied forces and the Karzai government. Second, these sanctuaries continue because members of the Pakistani military and security services collude with the Taliban and al-Qaeda. In the words of Holbrooke, AfPak was not an effort "…to saved eight syllables. It is an attempt to indicate and imprint in our DNA the fact that there is one theater of war, straddling an ill-defined border, the Durand Line, and that on the western side of that border, NATO and other forces are able to operate. On the eastern side, it's the sovereign territory of Pakistan. But it is there on the eastern side of this ill-defined border that the international terrorist movement is located. Al Qaeda and other organizations of its sort and we have to think of it that way, not to distinguish between the two." 45 AfPak's objectives were to disrupt the terrorist networks in Afghanistan and "especially Pakistan" to prevent attacks on international targets; to promote capable, accountable, and effective governance in Afghanistan; to develop an Afghan security force to meet insurgency and terrorism threats; to assist civilian control of the 46 The policy rested on pillars of military, civilian, and partnerships.
The second and third pillars called for greater civilian interaction between the U.S., its allies, and Afghans to address the rebuilding of Afghanistan. Specifically, AfPak pursued an "ends, ways, and means" analysis that Finally, the linkage had a deep psychological impact on Pakistan, which had to contend with the perception of being the problem country in South Asia, 53 and of being described as "duplicitous" to the more unforgiving "ally from hell" and "a greedy and total spoiler." 54 These claims and accusations often ignore the nature of the Pakistani state and its history, especially when it comes to Pakistani concerns vis-à-vis India. Interspersed within this is a sense that the U.S. sees Pakistan's fear of India as exaggerated or unrealistic, particularly when it comes to Afghanistan. 55 Members of the Pakistani Army argue that it internal and external factors compel them to engage in politics, while the Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate could successfully assert that its nefarious activities are not that different than the behavior of any other intelligence agency. Draft, Please Do Not Copy without Explicit Permission from Author the Pakistani state and as an attempt to strengthen institutions. Thus, the aid is given with less fanfare, as
Washington accepts that constantly reminding Pakistanis how much aid the country receives from the United States is counterproductive, especially when Pakistanis are increasingly distrust the U.S. 61
Second, as the U.S. combat operations end in Afghanistan, Pakistan's status as a frontline state remains, if not grows because Washington remains unable to untangle itself from the Afghan quagmire because of fears of an al-Qaeda-Taliban resurgence. The concern is linked to Washington's nascent concern with failed states, not to mention seeing its massive investment in Afghanistan go to waste. The discussion over the bilateral security agreement with Afghanistan is indicative of this schizophrenic, discombobulated policy, as when it seemed that there was little hope that the Afghans would ratify the agreement, the U.S. appeared willing and able to leave Afghanistan, and yet in the aftermath of the 2014 presidential election, the agreement was signed ensuring U.S.
presence in Afghanistan for another decade. 62 Thus, U.S. policymakers are in a difficult situation as on the one hand they recognize that Pakistan retains influence on events in Afghanistan through various proxies, including the Taliban, 63 but there is no clear policy on how to address such a situation possibly because of concerns that to do so would legitimize those Pakistanis that work and understand the Taliban. This is why policymakers in Pakistan and Afghanistan have increasingly pushed to improve bilateral relations, while at the same time engaging in polices that clearly aggravate the other. 64 Washington for its part, because of its fixation with Afghanistan, is striving to develop a relationship with Pakistan structured on how to shape Afghanistan's future, specifically regarding the Taliban, as opposed to structuring its relations with Pakistan, independently of Afghanistan.
Conclusion
In sum, U.S.-Pakistan relations are turbulent not only because of divergent strategic and national interests, but fundamental misunderstandings, largely by American policymakers, about Pakistan and what Washington
